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I. Introduction 
 “[S]chool authorities are clearly charged with the 
affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be 
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial 
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. If 
school authorities fail in their affirmative 
obligations[,] . . . judicial authority may be invoked. Once 
a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a 
district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs 
is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in 
equitable remedies.”1 
“Can we say in 1969 that a State has no duty to 
disestablish a dual system of higher education based 
upon race? The three-judge court in a careful opinion 
seems to draw a line between elementary and secondary 
schools on one hand and colleges and universities on the 
other. The inference is that if this were an elementary 
school, the result would be different.”2 
A long line of scholarship evaluates the work of the United 
States Supreme Court in effecting social change. Much of this 
scholarship centers on the role of the Supreme Court in creating, 
defining, and shaping racial equality rights and remedies. In a 
series of legal battles in the first decades of the twentieth 
century, civil rights advocates engaged in a lengthy and 
deliberate strategy to break the back of legal apartheid in 
American education by challenging the constitutionality of state 
policies barring African Americans from matriculation in 
exclusively white public colleges and universities throughout 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15–16 
(1971) (citations and quotations omitted) (finding that school systems that are in 
full compliance with Brown I may have fluctuating demographic patterns, and 
district courts should not intervene unless those entities deliberately altered the 
demographic composition of schools) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954)) [hereinafter Brown I]. 
 2. See Ala. State Teachers Ass’n v. Ala. Pub. Sch. & Coll. Auth., 393 U.S. 
400, 401 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (holding that this law is local as 
opposed to a state-wide law, thus “not requiring a three-judge court.”). 
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southern and border states.3 The strategy resulted in several 
Supreme Court opinions that articulate the early contours of a 
constitutional right to racial equality in educational opportunity.4 
The strategy then moved to litigating for equality in primary and 
secondary education.5 Ultimately, in the 1954 Brown I decision, a 
unanimous Supreme Court declared that state-sanctioned racial 
segregation in education violated the Constitution.6 The Brown 
Court clearly defined a constitutional right to desegregated 
education in the context of public elementary and secondary 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Alan Krueger et al., Race, Income and College in 25 Years: The 
Continuing Legacy of Segregation and Discrimination 8–9 (Princeton Univ. 
Educ. Research Section, Working Paper No. 9, 2004) 
https://www.princeton.edu/ceps/workingpapers/108krueger.pdf. “Southern and 
border states” refer to the seventeen states that maintained clear, state-
sponsored systems of segregation in public higher education at the time: 
Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.  
 4. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635–36 (1950) (explaining that 
Texas offered substantially unequal educational opportunities to black law 
students compared to their white counterparts, and finding that Texas was 
constitutionally required to admit African American applicants to white law 
school); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641 
(1950) (describing that state imposed restrictions requiring an African American 
student to sit in a row specified for colored students, at segregated table in the 
library, and a special table in cafeteria deprived the student of his personal and 
present right to equal protection of the laws); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 
Okla. , 332 U.S. 632, 632–33 (1948) (requiring University of Oklahoma to 
compel admittance and enrollment in the law school to African American 
applicant); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 352 (1938) (finding 
that “equal opportunity for legal training within the State was not furnished” 
and “that petitioner was entitled to be admitted to the law school of the State 
University.”); Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 594 (Md. 1936) (showing first 
recognition by any court of the inequality of segregated higher education, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals ordered the University of Maryland to admit Donald 
G. Murray, a black applicant, to its law school).  
 5. See generally GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON 
HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983) (exploring the strategy 
leading up to Brown v. Board of Education); see MARK V. TUSHNET, THE 
NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–50 (2d ed. 
2004). 
 6. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495 (stating “[s]eparate educational facilities 
are inherently unequal[; t]herefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others 
similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are . . . deprived of 
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
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schools.7 One year later, the Supreme Court decided upon a 
remedial course to make this abstract duty a reality. In Brown II, 
the Supreme Court declared that public schools in the United 
States must desegregate with “all deliberate speed.”8 At this time, 
activists with limited resources turned their focus on enforcing 
the remedial decrees in the context of primary and secondary 
education, curbing their efforts in the context of higher education. 
This Essay offers a brief examination of the desegregation of 
American public higher education as an illustration of the critical 
importance of adjudicatory remedies in helping to effectuate 
social change.  
The difficulty in implementing effective remedies, the 
seeming intractability of racial, spatial, and socioeconomic 
inequities, and the judicial retreat from civil rights injunctions as 
a method of relief in more recent decades has led to scholars 
questioning the efficacy of equitable decrees in remedying school 
segregation.9 Yet, in Brown’s wake, subsequent court decisions 
demarcating the equitable requirements necessary to give 
meaning to the articulated constitutional right, coupled with 
legislative and administrative directives10 fostered long-awaited, 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See id. at 492 (citing higher education cases as the foundation for its 
ruling).  
 8. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [hereinafter Brown 
II] (discussing a remedial scheme for segregated school systems). 
 9. See generally ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY 
DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2003); MICHAEL J. 
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2006); see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, Constraints 
Conditions, and the Courts, in Part 1 Civil Rights, in THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN 
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 72-106 (1991) (discussing the 
ineffectiveness of injunctions). 
 10. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits racial discrimination by 
any entity receiving federal funds. To facilitate enforcement, the United States 
Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) was 
allowed to deny federal funds to any educational institution engaging in racial 
segregation. HEW’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) was given the power to enforce 
Title VI. See, e.g., Nondiscrimination in Federally-Assisted Programs of the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare—Effectuation of Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 Fed. Reg. 16298, 16299–300 (Dec. 4, 1964) (amended 
by 32 Fed. Reg. 14556); Miscellaneous Amendments, 38 Fed. Reg. 17982 (July 5, 
1973); see generally Lia Epperson, Undercover Power: Examining the Role of the 
Executive Branch in Determining the Meaning and Scope of School Integration 
Jurisprudence, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 146 (2008) (examining the 
role of Title VI enforcement power on school desegregation).  
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significant advancements toward racial equality in educational 
opportunity.11 Such changes were most evident in elementary and 
secondary schools. Due to a combination of factors, including the 
limited resources of desegregation advocates, the complex nature 
of higher education desegregation, and the unpredictability of 
Supreme Court case selection, primary and secondary education 
was the subject of all of the Supreme Court’s equitable decrees in 
the wake of Brown.12 In the years following the Brown ruling, the 
Supreme Court offered no equitable remedial structure specific to 
American higher education.13 Eventually, some public colleges 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See, e.g., AMY STUART WELLS ET AL., BOTH SIDES NOW: THE STORY OF 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION’S GRADUATES (2008) (explaining that the most effective 
period of school desegregation took place between 1970 and 1990 when court 
ordered equitable remedies were at their strongest); see also JOHN R. LOGAN & 
DEIRDRE OAKLEY, LEWIS MUMFORD CTR. FOR COMPARATIVE URBAN AND REG'L 
RESEARCH, STATE UNIV. OF N.Y. AT ALBANY, THE CONTINUING LEGACY OF THE 
BROWN DECISION: COURT ACTION AND SCHOOL SEGREGATION, 1960–2000, at 2 
(2004) (illustrating that through consent decrees, advocates have affected more 
than simply the racial composition of elementary and secondary school 
classrooms, us[ing] equitable decrees to address newer forms of racial inequality 
such as resource inequality, racial segregation in special education classes, and 
discipline referrals); Lia Epperson, True Integration: Advancing Brown’s Goals 
in the Wake of Grutter, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 197–200 (2005) (discussing the 
value of racially integrated schools). 
 12. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971) 
(granting district court ample freedom to fashion remedies to desegregate 
schools, including court-mandated busing, redrawing of attendance zone lines, 
and using mathematical ratios); Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439–40 
(1968) (exploring how freedom-of-choice plans placed an undue burden on black 
schoolchildren and were unacceptable when more expedient and effective 
methods of desegregation were available); see also Green, 391 U.S. at 435 
(listing the factors to be considered in determining whether a public school has 
fulfilled its duty to desegregate, including student assignments, facilities, staff 
assignments, faculty assignments, extracurricular activities, and 
transportation); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201–04 (1973) 
(recognizing Latinos’ rights to desegregation and deciding that school districts 
have an affirmative duty to desegregate all city schools, even if school officials 
only instituted segregated schools in a portion of said district); Alexander v. 
Holmes Cty. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (“The obligation of every school 
district is to terminate the dual systems at once and to operate now and 
hereafter only unitary schools.”). 
 13. It is important to note, however, that the decisions never expressly 
limited the scope to elementary and secondary schools. Rather, they spoke of 
“public education.” See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at 436 (“[A] unitary, nonracial 
system of public education is the ultimate end to be brought about under 
Supreme Court decisions declaring unconstitutional segregated school systems”) 
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and universities, understanding the importance of Brown, took 
voluntary steps to eliminate the vestiges of racial segregation and 
discrimination from their admissions processes. As a result of 
such voluntary actions, however, public universities faced 
defensive court battles by white plaintiffs who argued that race-
conscious admissions policies violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.14 These battles gave rise 
to a distinct form of affirmative action jurisprudence, where 
courts examined the constitutionality of voluntarily adopted race-
conscious policies designed to “further student body diversity” 
rather than as policies designed to remedy the present effects of 
past racial segregation and discrimination.15 The remedial aspect 
of institutional restructuring in higher education was lost. This 
loss has resulted in higher education desegregation being defined 
in a context outside of the remedial dismantling of apartheid 
norms. In the absence of judicial oversight, foes of this 
dismantling have been able to capture the terminology and bend 
it to suit their purposes. 
While adjudicatory remedies are not the sole solution, courts 
play a powerful role in creating the equitable remedies that give 
meaning to constitutional rights.16 Indeed, some scholars have 
                                                                                                                 
(emphasis added); Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“The doctrine of ‘separate 
but equal’ has no place in the field of public education.”). 
 14. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277–78 (1978) 
(“[Bakke] alleged that the Medical School’s special admissions program operated 
to exclude him from the school on the basis of his race, in violation of his rights 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 15. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (noting that 
“[a]ttaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper 
institutional mission[,]” and that student body diversity is a compelling state 
interest that can justify using race in university admissions); Gratz v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (ruling that the policy of automatically granting large 
numbers of “points” to every underrepresented minority applicant was not 
narrowly tailored to state’s compelling interest in attaining diversity); Bakke, 
438 U.S. at 312–14 (“[T]he attainment of a diverse student body is a 
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education[;] . . . 
however, ethnic diversity is only one element in a range of factors which a 
university may properly consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous 
student body.”).  
 16. In previous work, I have examined both the historic significance and 
future possibilities of non-adjudicatory measures—such as administrative and 
regulatory equality directives—in effecting change. See Lia Epperson, 
Legislating Inclusion, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 91 (2012) (situating recent 
jurisprudence on the Constitution’s commitment to ending racial segregation in 
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written extensively on the role of adjudicatory remedies shaping 
the right itself.17 In the context of American public elementary 
and secondary schools, equitable decrees helped shape the 
trajectory of equality.18 It may be nearly impossible to detail the 
precise ways in which such court-based racial remedies fostered 
change apart from the legislative enactments and administrative 
directives that came in Brown’s wake.19 It is clear, moreover, that 
social movements and the role of the United States in the global 
push for democracy—through so-called “domino-effect”20 
policies—during the Cold War had a significant impact on the 
                                                                                                                 
public education in the framework of congressional power to enact enforcement 
legislation); Lia Epperson, Equality Dissonance: Jurisprudential Limitations 
and Legislative Opportunities, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 213, 216 (2011) (arguing 
that “[t]here is a unique opportunity to bridge the divide between constitutional 
ideals and practice in the realm of racial equality in education.”); see generally 
Lia Epperson, Undercover Power: Examining the Role of the Executive Branch in 
Determining the Meaning and Scope of School Integration Jurisprudence, 10 
BERKELEY J. OF AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 146 (2008) (arguing that the Department of 
Education’s Office for Civil Rights plays an extremely important role in 
addressing persistent racial isolation and inequality in educational 
opportunity).  
 17. See Daryl Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 858 (1999) (positing that the scope of a right is 
determined by the scope of the available remedy); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, 
OVERCOMING LAW 235 (1995) (“Everyone professionally involved with law knows 
that, as Holmes put it, judges legislate ‘interstitially,’ which is to say they make 
law, only more cautiously, more slowly, and in more principled, less partisan, 
fashion than legislators.”).  
 18.  See, e.g., Kristin A. Ballenger, Honors Thesis, The Grave Disparities in 
Modern Education, Segregation, and School Budgeting: A Comparison Between 
Brown v. Board of Education and San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, U. of Tenn. Honors Thesis Projects 1, 26 (2014), 
http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj/1686/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2017) 
(noting that the resurgence of present day segregation in public schools ensued 
after courts concluded that desegregation efforts could be eliminated) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 19. See infra Part III (discussing public higher education and the Supreme 
Court’s reluctance to articulate equitable remedies for higher education 
segregation).  
 20. The impact of post-Brown legislative and administrative initiatives 
may be similar to Dwight Eisenhower’s “Domino theory.” See Peter T. Leeson & 
Andrea M. Dean, The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation, 
53 AM. J. POL’Y SCI. 533, 533 (2009) (“You have a row of dominoes set up, you 
knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty 
that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a 
disintegration that would have the most profound influences.”). 
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resulting change.21 Yet, adjudicatory remedies held a unique 
space in providing a forceful mandate for the destabilization of 
existing apartheid norms.22 The pronouncements in the 
jurisprudential progeny of Brown II gave meaning to the 
constitutional remedy first detailed in that case. The 
destabilization of the deeply entrenched racial segregation and 
discrimination in public elementary and secondary schools 
brought by such adjudicatory remedies provided a fertile ground 
for the implementation of administrative directives and other 
non-adjudicatory equality measures.23 Thus, the critical 
importance of equitable remedies in this context is the space that 
court ordered remedies created for many innovative avenues for 
change. 
In the context of public higher education, however, no such 
adjudicatory remedies came from the Supreme Court until nearly 
forty years after Brown. Until that time, state systems of higher 
education had no judicial mandate to affirmatively eliminate the 
vestiges of a century-old segregated system in the way that 
primary education did. This absence of equitable remedies 
ordered by the Supreme Court meant that state systems of higher 
education could maintain racially unequal systems for decades 
after Brown. Similarly, without court-based remedies to 
destabilize the status quo, there wasn’t the requisite space for the 
non-adjudicatory remedies24 that proved essential to the 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See infra Part III (describing how social movements and related 
geopolitical activity helped foster an environment conducive to effectuating the 
court-ordered remedies and spurring change). 
 22. See generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL 
POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996) (examining 
existing apartheid norms). 
 23. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 287–88 (1977) (upholding 
remedial education programs combatting school segregation); Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (permitting federal 
courts to order busing, student ratios, and attendance zones to desegregate 
schools); United States v. Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 235–37 (1969) (upholding 
mathematical ratios to desegregate faculty and staff). But see Milliken v. 
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 737–48 (1974) (invalidating desegregation injunction as 
overly broad, as it affected non-party, suburban school districts). 
 24. See infra Part II.C (describing the relationship between social 
movements and adjudicatory remedies).  
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furtherance of public elementary and secondary school 
desegregation.25 
The struggle to desegregate public higher education shows 
how valuable opportunities for social change may be lost when 
the court fails to connect a constitutional remedy to the 
articulated right. As Owen Fiss expressed, “[r]ights and remedies 
are but two phases of a single social process—of trying to give 
meaning to our public values. Rights operate in the realm of 
abstraction, remedies in the world of practical reality.”26 In the 
absence of any judicially articulated remedy, public colleges and 
universities did not properly give meaning to the right to racial 
equality articulated in Brown. 
This essay examines some of the collective forces that have 
hindered the articulation and enforcement of equitable remedies 
in the realm of public higher education. Part II of this essay 
examines the jurisprudential road to defining the constitutional 
right to desegregated education, as well as the remedy to make 
that right a practical reality.27 Part III highlights the most 
critical issues hindering effective constitutional injunctions to 
remedy American public higher education.28 These include those 
factors that distinguish higher education from elementary and 
secondary schools, the unique development of the public system 
of historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) in the 
United States as a tool to entrench segregation, and the lack of 
adjudicatory and administrative remedies articulated for higher 
education in the wake of the Brown decision.29 This section also 
highlights Maryland’s public university system as a concrete 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How 
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1022–25 (2004) 
(arguing that judicial remedies flowing from public law cases such as school 
desegregation litigation provided rights to destabilize racially segregated public 
schools that previously failed to provide constitutionally required equality and 
have resisted political change). 
 26. See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
52 (1979) (discussing why judges are charged with crafting remedies).  
 27. See infra Part II (describing the litigation strategies and court decisions 
that paved the way for a constitutional right to desegregated education). 
 28. See infra Part III (explaining possible reasons for lack of satisfactory 
remedies). 
 29. See infra Part III (noting the historical contexts, and the consequences, 
of different situational factors that have prevented adequate remedies). 
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example of some of the aforementioned issues.30 Finally, Part IV 
outlines some of the normative implications of this history of 
ineffective injunctive relief and potential for extrajudicial 
enforcement and directives.31 
II. The Antecedents and Progeny of Brown: Identifying the 
Constitutional Right and Remedy in Educational Equality Cases 
“It is emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”32 
A. Racial Equality in Higher Education Cases: Identifying a 
Constitutional Right 
The litigation strategy employed to dismantle pervasive 
racial discrimination and segregation in the United States has at 
its roots civil rights leaders’ efforts to extirpate segregation in 
public higher education.33 Since their inception and well into the 
1960s, public colleges and universities in the United States closed 
their doors to black applicants. Prior to the end of the Civil War, 
the majority of blacks in the United States lived as slaves in the 
Southern states, where they were prohibited by law or social 
custom from learning to read or write.34 At the end of the 
nineteenth century, federal funding35 spurred the creation of a 
two-tiered system of public universities. Southern and border 
states created historically black colleges and universities, for a 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See id.. (proving the issues that inhibit sufficient remedies, through a 
case study on Maryland’s public university system). 
 31. See infra Part IV (noting the overall effect of remedies in aiding social 
reform). 
 32. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (establishing the 
foundational principle of “judicial review.”). 
 33. See MCNEIL, supra note 5, at 133–35 (describing the beginnings of the 
process that was used to break down racial segregation in schools). 
 34. The Slave Experience: Education, Arts, & Culture, Historical Overview, 
PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/slavery/experience/education/history2.html (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2017).  
 35. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 321–29 (2012) (requiring payments to endow and 
maintain “colleges for the benefit of agriculture and the mechanic arts” and 
allowing colleges to establish separate schools for “white” and “colored” 
students, as long as the schools received equal funding). 
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host of reasons, though all aimed at ensuring blacks did not gain 
access to traditionally white institutions.36 At the time, the black 
colleges and universities were limited to vocational training, 
leaving blacks without any avenues for liberal arts education or 
graduate training.37 The Supreme Court’s 1896 decision in Plessy 
v. Ferguson38 upholding racial segregation further entrenched 
this two-tier system. 
Thus, the litigators dedicated to dismantling this system of 
racial inequality, one that had been sewn into the fabric of 
American institutions, mounted a well-structured attack.39 The 
litigation strategy, developed with an understanding of limited 
legal resources, the location of willing plaintiffs, and the local and 
national social and political milieu, began by filing suits against 
segregated higher education, and then moved to suits for 
equalization of teacher salaries and finally against primary and 
secondary education.40 The NAACP, which developed the 
litigation strategy and argued all cases before the Supreme 
Court, chose to begin the attack with segregated higher education 
largely because plaintiffs were more readily available.41 
Thousands of blacks graduated from black four-year colleges, 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See Lynch v. State, No. 08-S-450-NE, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155012, at 
*8 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 7, 2011) (“Strict white control was the hallmark of 
black higher education in the state until the 1970’s.”).; Sean B. Seymore, Note, 
I’m Confused: How Can the Federal Government Promote Diversity in Higher 
Education Yet Continue to Strengthen Historically Black Colleges?, 12 WASH. & 
LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 287, 294−98 (2006) (detailing the history of HBCUs 
and examining the government’s seemingly contradictory position of supporting 
integration in higher education while promoting the maintenance of HBCUs).  
 37. See UNITED STATES OFFICE OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE 
HIGHER EDUCATION OF NEGROES, VOL. II: GENERAL STUDIES OF COLLEGES FOR 
NEGROES 14–15 (1942) (showing that by 1940, only two of the approximately 
thirty black public colleges in the Southern and border states included a 
professional school when, at the time, there were more than 100 professional 
programs offered at white public colleges in these states). 
 38. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (repudiating the 
principal purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, and creating the legal doctrine 
of “separate but equal,” which allowed states to require and enforce racial 
segregation and discrimination). 
 39. See MCNEIL, supra note 5, at 133–40 (discussing the landscape prior to 
Brown). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. at 137–39 (explaining the reasons why the NAACP chose to 
begin the battle of desegregation with higher education). 
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many of whom sought graduate education. College-educated 
blacks seeking graduate degrees were readily available, and 
given the level of racial hostility at the time, poking the figurative 
beast was simply more suitable for adult plaintiffs. A plaintiff in 
an elementary or secondary school lawsuit may risk parental 
unemployment and the child’s safety. Finally, advocates could 
espouse a clear legal theory in graduate school desegregation 
cases; there were very few graduate and professional schools 
available to blacks at the time, so advocating for admission to 
white institutions became the only option.42 
In a series of decisions beginning in the 1930s, the Supreme 
Court began to articulate the contours of a constitutional right to 
equality in cases requiring the admission of black applicants to 
previously segregated state universities. These decisions focused 
on the inherent unconstitutionality of the substantive racial 
inequality in public higher education. Beginning in 1938, the 
Supreme Court first recognized the inequality of segregation in 
public higher education as a constitutional violation.43 In a 
number of subsequent rulings, the courts fleshed out the 
substantive right to equality in the realm of public higher 
education. These decisions included striking down the use of state 
funds as a means to send black applicants to private graduate 
schools outside state borders rather than to educate them in 
public white institutions within their state.44 It additionally 
included requirements to admit black applicants to traditionally 
                                                                                                                 
 42. In 1943, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina 
had no professional schools for African Americans. 
 43. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 352 (1938) 
(explaining that a state could not pay for black students to attend graduate 
school out of state—they had to build a new graduate school for black students 
or integrate the existing white graduate schools); see also Pearson v. Murray, 
182 A. 590, 594 (Md. 1936) (ordering, for the first time by any court of law 
recognizing inequality of segregated higher education, that the University of 
Maryland admit Donald G. Murray to its law school); Pearson, 182 A. at 593 
(explaining that after Pearson, Maryland did not appeal the ruling to the United 
States Supreme Court, so it did not result in nationally binding precedent). 
 44. See Pearson, 182 A. at 594 (“[T]he state has undertaken the function of 
education in the law, but has omitted students of one race . . . solely because of 
their color. If those students are to be offered equal treatment in the 
performance of the function, they must, at present, be admitted to the one school 
provided.”). 
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white public universities45 and forbade states from circumscribing 
their presence and movements in classrooms or campus 
buildings.46 
In the case that sounded the death knell for racial 
segregation in higher education, the Supreme Court required 
Texas to admit an African American applicant to the state law 
school rather than a hastily-constructed school exclusively for 
blacks.47 In Sweatt v. Painter, the Supreme Court offered the 
most coherent and detailed explanation of a constitutional right 
to a racially desegregated, equal education: 48  
It may be argued that excluding petitioner from that school is 
no different from excluding white students from the new law 
school. This contention overlooks realities. It is unlikely that a 
member of a group so decisively in the majority, attending a 
school with rich traditions and prestige which only a history of 
consistently maintained excellence could command, would 
claim that the opportunities afforded him for legal education 
were unequal to those held open to petitioner. That such a 
claim, if made, would be dishonored by the State, is no answer. 
Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through 
indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.49 
Without exclusively overturning the existing constitutional 
doctrine of “separate but equal” espoused in Plessy v. Ferguson50, 
the Supreme Court nonetheless developed and articulated a 
constitutional vision that all but ensured the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 632, 633 (1948) 
(requiring the University of Oklahoma to admit and enroll a black applicant in 
the law school). 
 46. See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 
642 (1950) (explaining that “the conditions under which this appellant is 
required to receive his education deprived him of his personal and present right 
to the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 47. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (finding that 
educational opportunities offered white and black law students by the state of 
Texas were not substantially equal, and that the equal protection clause of the 
14th Amendment required that relator be admitted to the University of Texas 
Law School).  
 48. See id. at 635–36 (explaining that legal education equivalent to that 
offered by the State to students of other races is a full constitutional right).  
 49. Id. at 634–35 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 50. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 563 (1896) (finding that 
segregation is not unconstitutional if the segregated groups are treated equally). 
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would reach the conclusion it famously reached in Brown v. 
Board of Education51 four years later.  
Brown represented the culmination of a lengthy litigation 
strategy to dismantle racial apartheid in American public 
education.52 By 1950, advocates had amassed enough legal 
victories and experience in litigating complex constitutional cases 
to shift strategies, graduating to attacking racial segregation in 
education squarely, forcefully, and in multiple jurisdictions.53 It 
was at this time that the strategy shifted to litigating primary 
and secondary education cases.54 Thus, unlike prior Supreme 
Court education decisions, the Brown case consolidated four cases 
dealing exclusively with elementary and secondary public 
schools.55 In striking down state-sponsored racial segregation in 
these schools, the Supreme Court declared that “education is 
perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments.”56 Because of this, the Supreme Court held, “where 
the state has undertaken to provide [education, it] is a right 
which must be made available to all on equal terms.”57 In 
overturning Plessy, the Supreme Court held that “in the field of 
public education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. 
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal,” and 
amount to a deprivation of equal protection of the laws 
guaranteed by the Constitution.58 
                                                                                                                 
 51. See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 491–96 (1954) (declaring racial segregation 
in public schools unconstitutional).  
 52. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD 
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 133–39 (1975) 
(discussing how quantitative evidence provided proof that the theory behind 
separate but equal was a fiction). See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN 
THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 58–61, 85–87, 111–15 (1994). 
 53. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 135–37 (providing an overview of how 
litigators attacked segregation directly). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 486 (explaining that the four consolidated 
cases come from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware). 
 56. Id. at 493. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 495. 
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B. Identifying a Constitutional Remedy: Brown II and its Progeny 
Because of the complexities inherent in crafting a remedy to 
attain the constitutional right articulated in Brown, the Supreme 
Court left formulating the decrees for later.59 In Brown II, the 
Supreme Court offered its first, timid articulation of a remedy to 
restore equality in public education.60 In that decision, the 
Supreme Court underscored the “practical flexibility,”61 the 
“facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs,” 
and consideration of administrative and local problems that are 
inherent in exercising equity power to remedy this constitutional 
violation.62 While many bemoaned the somewhat contradictory 
tone of the opinion that called for an end to racial segregation 
with “all deliberate speed,” the decision nonetheless laid the 
foundation for courts to begin the long, arduous process of 
crafting equitable remedies.63 
In several cases over the next fifteen years, the Supreme 
Court articulated with more force and clarity the contours of the 
constitutional remedy for racially segregated education.64 As a 
result of several factors, including the limited resources of 
                                                                                                                 
 59. See id. (subordinating the issue of appropriate relief to the issue of 
whether segregation was constitutional in public schools on re-argument 
because the decisions in this class action suit had wide applicability, the local 
conditions were varied, making the cases highly complex).  
 60. See Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (explaining that the court 
realizes that the time required to implement the changes in schools will vary by 
district and additional time may be given). 
 61. See id. at 300 (recognizing that different remedies may be required for 
each particular case and granting the lower courts authority to decide as they 
see fit). 
 62. See id. at 300–01 (considering some of the potential administrative 
conflicts that the implementation of desegregation could create within local 
governments and recognizing that courts may be required to grant extra time to 
violators to solve them). 
 63. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR 
RACIAL JUSTICE 112 (1987) (indicating that the ambiguous definition of “all 
deliberate speed” led to, in the author’s opinion, a ten-year delay in 
implementation of desegregation). 
 64. See Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964) (requiring the 
“supervisors” to levy taxes in order to adequately fund the county public 
schools); Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (requiring the “school 
board . . . to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and 
promises realistically to work now.”). 
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advocates and the reluctance of the Supreme Court to wrestle 
with lower court decisions regarding higher education 
desegregation, each of these opinions offered guidelines in the 
context of primary and secondary education yet remained silent 
on how to remedy the issue of segregation in public higher 
education. When state governments attempted to defy the 
Supreme Court’s order to desegregate—on the grounds that such 
desegregation would cause too much public unrest—the Supreme 
Court firmly stated:  
State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, 
management, funds, or property cannot be squared with the 
Amendment’s command that no State shall deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The 
right of a student not to be segregated on racial grounds in 
schools so maintained is indeed so fundamental and pervasive 
that it is embraced in the concept of due process of law.65  
The Supreme Court reiterated that “[t]he principles 
announced [in Brown] . . . are indispensable for the protection of 
the freedoms guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of us. 
Our constitutional ideal of equal justice under law is thus made a 
living truth.”66 Later, in cases like Green v. County School 
Board,67 the Supreme Court held that simply removing the 
explicit barriers to matriculation at white elementary and 
secondary schools and adopting a “freedom of choice” plan for 
student enrollment was unsatisfactory.68 Such a remedy both 
placed an undue burden on black schoolchildren and was less 
expedient or effective than alternate methods of desegregation.69 
The Supreme Court called for a clear elimination of segregated 
public schools, requiring “every school district . . . to terminate 
the dual systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958) (emphasis added). 
 66. Id. at 20.  
 67. See Green, 391 U.S. at 441–42 (declaring that schools have a burden to 
create a desegregation plan that works quickly). 
 68. Id.  
 69. See id. (“[T]he plan has operated simply to burden children and their 
parents with a responsibility which Brown II placed squarely on the School 
Board.”). 
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unitary schools.”70 Providing not only a mandate but also a road 
map to public schools, the Supreme Court outlined a number of 
factors to consider in determining whether a public school has 
fulfilled its constitutional duty to desegregate.71 Public school 
districts across the nation utilized these “Green factors” in 
remedying their segregated school systems.72 
Three years later, the Supreme Court further issued a decree 
to eliminate all vestiges of segregation “root and branch” from 
public schools.73 In Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of 
Education, the Supreme Court granted district courts ample 
freedom to fashion wide-ranging remedies that included court-
mandated busing, redrawing of attendance zone lines, and using 
mathematical ratios to desegregate students.74 The Supreme 
Court explicitly extended these remedies in recognizing Latinos’ 
right to desegregation in 1973.75 While the Supreme Court 
refused to extend the reach of desegregation remedies beyond the 
borders where state-sponsored segregation took place,76 it 
nonetheless continued to show a breadth in the range of equitable 
remedies that could be ordered, including the use of remedial 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Alexander v. Holmes Cty. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 19 (1969). 
 71. See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435–37 (1968) (describing 
what factors district courts should consider when evaluating a school’s 
desegregation plan).  
 72. See Sean F. Reardon et al., Brown Fades: The End of Court-Ordered 
School Desegregation and the Resegregation of American Public Schools, 31 J. 
POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 876, 876 (2012) (indicating that the case “ultimately led 
to substantial decreases in school segregation throughout the South.”). 
 73. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) 
(explaining that district courts have broad power when constructing remedies to 
desegregate schools). 
 74. See id. at 17 (indicating that “[a]s with any equity case, the nature of 
the violation determines the scope of the remedy [, and i]n default by the school 
authorities of their obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad 
power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school system.”). 
 75. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 197–98 (1973) (explaining 
that Hispanic students face the same discrimination as black students and may 
also be treated as an identifiable class under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 76. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974) (ruling that a 
district court generally may not redraw the boundaries of an integrated school 
district to desegregate another school district). 
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education programs, curricular reform, and teacher training.77 All 
of these equitable decrees set forth by the Supreme Court 
provided a necessary foundation for the destabilization of an 
apartheid system in public schools.78  
C. The Complementary Relationship Between Social Movements 
and Administrative and Adjudicatory Remedies 
In addition to the essential role the aforementioned judicial 
mandate and road map played in the desegregation of public 
elementary and secondary schools in the wake of Brown, social 
movements and ensuing geopolitical activity helped foster an 
environment conducive to effectuating the court-ordered remedies 
and spurring change. Such change occurred in large measure as a 
result of tremendous public forces for desegregation at the time of 
the ruling.79 In addition to the public outrage over acts of racial 
violence,80 the United States played a global role in advocating for 
a strong democracy. The maintenance of an apartheid system 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 272–74, 288 (1977) (explaining 
that a district court may order remedial education programs to children who 
have suffered from discrimination, and these programs may include service 
training for educators and revised testing). 
 78. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 25, at 1022–25 (describing the tools 
required in order to supervise institutional restructuring effectively). 
 79. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 123 (“If the United States is to 
stand before the world as an exemplar of equality of rights . . . [i]t seems to us 
that the language of the Fourteenth Amendment must be tortured out of 
common meaning to make segregation practices in education anything except 
unconstitutional” (quoting Equal Rights in Education, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 
1948) at 22L)). 
 80. See, e.g., Jay Stewart, The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free 
Expression: From the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 973–74 (2008) (“It took a hardened heart not to be 
offended by nonviolent protesters being slammed against walls from the force of 
fire hoses, set upon with police dogs and clubbed by baton-wielding cops, all 
under the direction of Birmingham [Alabama]’s overtly racist police chief, T. 
Eugene ‘Bull’ Connor.”). See also David B. Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, 
Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events Leading to the Introduction of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 646 (1995) (“Massive non-violent civil 
disobedience was met with equally intense violent police action . . . . black 
children kneeling in prayer or singing spirituals as they walked down sidewalks 
were attacked by vicious police dogs and rolled down the streets by fire 
department water cannons.”).  
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domestically while advocating for equality abroad made the 
United States the subject of international derision.81 In these 
school desegregation cases, the United States Department of 
Justice filed amicus briefs highlighting the importance of foreign 
policy to the issue of racial inequality in the nation: “[It] is in the 
context of a world in which freedom and equality must become 
living realities, if the democratic way of life is to survive, that the 
issues of these cases should be viewed.”82 In a brief filed to the 
Supreme Court in Brown, the Department of Justice focused even 
more forcefully on the relationship between the “world struggle 
between freedom and tyranny” and the problem of “racial 
discrimination.”83 
In addition to the social and geopolitical climate fostering the 
destabilization of existing norms of racial inequality, subsequent 
legislative and executive directives helped to spur real social 
reform in public education. In 1964, Congress passed the Civil 
Rights Act, which prohibited racial discrimination by any entity 
receiving federal funds.84 This provided a strong mechanism for 
forcing public elementary and secondary schools to make real the 
right articulated in Brown I and the remedy outlined in 
                                                                                                                 
 81. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR AND CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE 
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 79–83 (2000) (explaining that some United States 
politicians believed segregation harmed the United States’ foreign policy 
relations during the Cold War era); Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as Cold 
War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 62–66 (1988) (describing how the 
international community scrutinized American politicians and leaders who 
advocated for democracy in a postwar world while dealing with racial 
segregation at home). 
 82. See Dudziak, Desegregation as Cold War Imperative, supra note 81, at 
109 (referring to how the Department of Justice’s articulated its stance against 
school segregation in amicus briefs before the Supreme Court). 
 83. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 1954 & 1955, in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND 
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
121 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) (“The existence of 
discrimination against minority groups in the United States has an adverse 
effect upon our relations with the other countries.”). 
 84. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); 
see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2016) (“No person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”). 
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Brown II.85 Ultimately, the Office for Civil Rights of the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and later the 
newly-formed Department of Education, had real sway in shaping 
the scope and meaning of school desegregation.86 Using its 
enforcement power, the Office for Civil Rights produced 
guidelines detailing the requirements for desegregating public 
school districts.87 
As a result of these collective forces, public elementary and 
secondary schools became less segregated. The percentage of 
black students in majority white schools in the South rose from 2 
to 33 percent between 1964 and 1970.88 By the late 1980s, 44 
percent of black students attended majority white schools.89 
While political forces and administrative remedies 
undoubtedly played a critical role in pressuring Supreme Court 
movement toward outlining a constitutional right to public 
education at all levels in the United States, it is only in the field 
of elementary and secondary education that the Supreme Court 
articulated a constitutional remedy in the form of equitable 
decrees to effectuate Brown I & II.90 By offering a judicial 
mandate for change, the Supreme Court actively upset existing 
norms to such an extent that the abstract right could become 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (finding that the “separate but 
equal” doctrine has no place in public education, and that segregation is a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Brown 
II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (deciding that local school boards and local courts 
were responsible for implementing desegregation “with all deliberate speed.”). 
 86. See generally Lia Epperson, Undercover Power: Examining the Role of 
the Executive Branch in Determining the Meaning and Scope of School 
Integration Jurisprudence, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 146 (2008) 
(focusing on the interaction between the federal and executive branches of 
government concerning school integration after the end of school segregation). 
 87. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(a) (2015) (allowing for enforcement through 
termination of federal assistance proceedings carried out by the Department of 
Justice or State or local courts). 
 88. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, HARV. C. R. PROJECT, RACIAL 
TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEGREGATION 13 (2006) 
(analyzing how school segregation still exists today). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493 (finding that “segregation of children in 
public schools solely on the basis of race . . . deprives [the children of the 
minority group] of equal educational opportunities” and violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (requiring that desegregation be carried 
out quickly and enforced by local and district courts). 
CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 363 
more of a practical reality. In the absence of such destabilization 
for higher education, public colleges and universities remained 
segregated for many decades to come.91 By the time the Supreme 
Court offered a remedy nearly forty years after the Brown ruling, 
the judicial, social, and political momentum for wide-ranging 
equitable remedies had passed. 
III. The Case of Public Higher Education: Where did the 
Court Go? 
Many advocates and scholars see structural reform as an 
imperfect, unwieldy tool to effect change. Indeed, in the context of 
school desegregation, implementing successful remedies 
confounded jurists and advocates due to deeply entrenched 
residential segregation, intractable economic inequality, and 
pervasive racial hostility.92 Nonetheless, remedies articulated by 
the highest Court offer a powerful foundation from which to begin 
the process of change. The role of equitable remedies in giving 
meaning to the constitutional right to racial equality in education 
is to eliminate the very conditions that create and maintain 
systems of inequality.93 Structural reform litigation offsets the 
“negatives” of its unwieldiness with the “positives” of creating an 
environment for long-term change. 
The destabilization brought by adjudicatory enforcement 
helped create the fertile ground for ensuing administrative 
directives and regulatory enforcement that gave meaning to 
                                                                                                                 
 91. See Knight v. Alabama, 476 F.3d 1219, 1220 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[M]any 
of the State’s policies governing higher education tended to perpetuate its 
formerly de jure segregated university system.”); Peter Applebome, College 
Segregation Persists, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 1995), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/18/us/college-segregation-persists-study-
says.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2017) (noting that more than eighty percent of 
students at most flagship universities in the South were white in 1995) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 92. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 122 (1995) (finding that 
school districts are only required to restrict de jure segregation, and have no 
obligation to provide salary increases or remedial education in order to combat 
de facto segregation). 
 93. See Fiss, supra note 26, at 32 (providing a critique on structural 
reform). 
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Brown’s call for equality in educational opportunity.94 The 
Supreme Court’s failure to articulate such a remedy in public 
higher education may occur for a host of complex reasons, 
including the structure of higher education and its governance, 
the unique role of historically black colleges, and changes to 
Supreme Court composition in the years following Brown.95 
A. Distinguishing Public Higher Education  
Even in the instances where higher education desegregation 
cases entered the courts in Brown’s wake,96 there are a number of 
factors that may have contributed to the Supreme Court’s 
reluctance to articulate equitable remedies for higher education 
segregation. The context of American higher education differs 
significantly from public elementary and secondary schools in a 
number of ways. For instance, while the United States has 
provided free, compulsory elementary and secondary education 
since the early nineteenth century,97 American public colleges 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 95. Id.  
 96. See, e.g., Geier v. Univ. of Tenn., 597 F.2d 1056, 1065 (6th Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886 (1979) (finding that Tennessee had a duty to do more 
than have an open admissions policy for its public universities because Brown I 
and Brown II apply to public higher education as well as primary and secondary 
education); Norris v. State Council of Higher Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1368, 1369 
(E.D. Va. 1971) (indicating that “Bland [a two-year institution and agency of the 
state], cannot impede another agency of the state, Virginia State, in its efforts to 
fully integrate it student body[;]. . . [t]herefore, . . .we will enjoin Bland and its 
parent, William and Mary [a four-year institution], from escalating Bland into a 
four-year college”), aff’d sub nom. Bd. of Visitors of the Coll. of William & Mary 
v. Norris, 404 U.S. 907 (1971); Ala. State Teachers Ass’n v. Ala. Pub. Sch. & 
Coll. Auth., 289 F. Supp. 784, 787–88 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (declining to exercise 
equitable power to impose a desegregation remedy in the case of dual system of 
higher education, stating, “[w]e too are reluctant at this time to go much beyond 
preventing discriminatory admissions”), aff’d per curiam, 393 U.S. 400 (1969). 
But see Frasier v. Bd. of Transp., 134 F. Supp. 589, 592 (M.D. N.C. 1955) 
(confirming that Brown I applied to higher education), aff’d, 350 U.S. 979 
(1956). 
 97. See Lisa M. Lukasik, The Latest Home Education Challenge: The 
Relationship Between Home Schools and Public Schools, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1913, 
1918 (1996) (“Massachusetts passed the nation’s first compulsory attendance 
law in 1852. By the early twentieth century, every state in the nation required 
school attendance.”).  
CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 365 
and universities are neither free nor compulsory.98 Rather, even 
public universities have competitive admissions processes and 
come at a cost.99 In addition, public elementary and secondary 
schools are thought to be more fungible. While many would 
contest the notion that all public elementary and secondary 
schools are equal, the Brown Court acknowledged as much in its 
opinion.100 Colleges and universities vary more in terms of 
prestige and quality. Further, while advocates focused their 
litigation efforts outside of higher education, lower courts 
questioned the practicality of heavy adjudicative involvement in 
educational policy for colleges and universities when courts were 
already so heavily involved in the governance of elementary and 
secondary schools.101 Thus, the Supreme Court declined to enter 
the thicket—even when given the opportunity—due to conflicting 
lower court decisions.102 Without a mandate from the high Court, 
lower courts struggled for a clearly defined adjudicatory remedy. 
                                                                                                                 
 98. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS, EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IN 
PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION, xii (1960) (“Public education beyond high school . . . 
is offered by every State, and its importance to the Nation’s welfare and security 
is being recognized more and more, still it is neither provided for all nor 
compelled of any.”).  
 99. See John W. Schoen, Why does a college degree cost so much?, CNBC, 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/16/why-college-costs-are-so-high-and-rising.html 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2017) (explaining the cost of both private and public 
universities today and tracking the increase in cost through history) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 100. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954). 
 101. See, e.g., Lorne Fienberg, United States v. Fordice and the 
Desegregation of Public Higher Education: Groping for Root and Branch, 34 B.C. 
L. REV. 803, 850 (1993) (arguing that historically black colleges should not be 
merged with white universities or closed because they serve the important 
purpose of creating “greater access and enhanced educational opportunities for 
black students.”). 
 102. Compare Norris v. State Council of Higher Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1368, 
1373 (E.D. Va. 1971) (explaining that Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 
(1968) “defined a constitutional duty owed as well to college students”) aff’d sub 
nom. Bd. of Visitors of the Coll. of William & Mary v. Norris, 404 U.S. 907 
(1971), with Ala. State Teachers Ass’n v. Ala. Pub. Sch. & Coll. Auth., 289 F. 
Supp. 784, 787–88 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (declining to exercise equitable power to 
impose a desegregation remedy in the case of dual system of higher education), 
aff’d per curiam, 393 U.S. 400 (1969). 
366 23 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 343 (2017) 
B. Role of HBCUs 
For decades, many traditionally white public colleges and 
universities struggled to fulfill the constitutional duty set forth in 
Brown II. A number of institutions persistently closed their doors 
to African American applicants after the decision.103 In addition 
to the well-established white institutions, remedial jurisprudence 
regarding public higher education would have to contend with the 
dilemma of how to resolve the fate of those historically black 
public colleges that held an incongruous position in American 
history. For nearly a century, historically black colleges and 
universities were largely the only institutions of higher learning 
open to blacks in the United States.104 As such, historically black 
institutions have served a critical role in educating African 
American students during segregation and beyond.105 These 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See generally ROBERT A. PRATT, WE SHALL NOT BE MOVED: THE 
DESEGREGATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA (2002) (recalling the life of 
Horace Ward, an African American student who was instrumental in the 
desegregation of the University of Georgia); see Thomas D. Russell, “Keep 
Negroes Out of Most Classes Where There Are a Large Number of Girls”: The 
Unseen Power of the Ku Klux Klan and Standardized Testing at the University 
of Texas, 1899–1999, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 35 (2010) (detailing the battle for 
desegregation at the University of Texas). Some public institutions did take 
early steps to eliminate segregation. In 1951, for instance, the University of 
Louisville admitted black students to all of its programs, simultaneously closing 
the branch of the university that had previously operated for black students. See 
Jack Greenberg, Racial Integration of Teachers—A Growing Problem, 20 J. 
NEGRO EDUC. 285, 294 (1951) (“In 1950, the Kentucky General Assembly 
amended the State’s Day law, which requires segregation in education, by 
permitting boards of trustees of institutions of higher learning to open their 
classes to Negroes. . . . The University of Louisville greeted the law by voting to 
abolish segregation . . . .”). 
 104. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., HISTORICALLY BLACK 
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES AND HIGHER EDUCATION DESEGREGATION 1 (Mar. 
1991), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/hq9511.html (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2017) (“[P]ublic support for higher education for black students was 
[governed by the] Second Morrill Act . . . [which] required states with racially 
segregated public higher education systems to provide a land-grant institution 
for black students whenever a [one] was established and restricted for white 
students”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
 105. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 748 (1992) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (finding that historically black colleges have not only survived, but 
have flourished and “expanded as opportunities for blacks to enter historically 
white institutions have expanded.”). 
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institutions have their own traditions and alumni base. 
Perpetuating racial segregation and white supremacy, however, 
were also motivating factors for the construction and minimal 
maintenance of black public colleges and universities.106  
Once Brown II outlawed state mandated apartheid, states 
were required to do something to address the long-standing racial 
segregation and inequality that existed in systems of higher 
education.107 Unfortunately, there was no clear path as to what 
that something should entail.108 One alternative remedy involved 
the transformation of HBCUs via increased funding and 
enhanced programmatic options, thus increasing their 
desirability as alternatives to traditionally white institutions for 
students of all races.109 An alternate remedy was to dismantle 
black public colleges, as they were deemed tools of racial 
segregation.110 Without hope for a true and immediate 
destabilization of the existing apartheid structure, however, 
many African Americans pushed back against the elimination of 
existing institutions.111 Even in more recent years, efforts to close 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 104, at 1 (noting that HBCUs 
were created “to serve the educational needs of black Americans . . . [who] were 
generally denied admission to traditionally white institutions.”).104 
 107. See Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (concluding that racial 
discrimination in public educational institutions is unconstitutional and 
directing the lower courts to implement conforming measures and revise local 
law). 
 108. See id. at 301 (providing ways that local courts may revise their public-
school admission policies and state law, but failing to specify or mandate these 
revisions). 
 109. See Scott Jaschik, Defining Desegregation, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 22, 
2012), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/10/22/federal-judge-gets-
ready-decide-suit-supporters-marylands-historically-black (last visited Apr. 26, 
2017) (citing the stark difference between the amount of state funds allocated to 
historically white public universities and those allocated to historically black 
public universities) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
and Social Justice). 
 110. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. RAFFEL, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF SCHOOL 
SEGREGATION AND DESEGREGATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 263 (1998) 
(“There is some fear that [Fordice] imperils [HBCUs] . . . If the Court applied 
the same standard to higher-education desegregation that it applied to 
elementary . . . education . . . HBCUs would be viewed as vestiges of a dual 
system and would . . . be eliminated.”). 
 111. See Gil Kujovich, Equal Opportunity in Higher Education and the Black 
Public College: The Era of Separate but Equal, 72 MINN. L. REV. 29, 33 (1987) 
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HBCUs have met with criticism that such a remedy may impose 
significant educational and social costs on African American 
communities.112  
While constitutional doctrine required an end to state 
mandated apartheid in public education, colleges and universities 
lacked any judicial roadmap as to how to implement a remedial 
structure.113 As such, historically black colleges and universities 
remained in a “twilight zone.”114 Compared to traditionally white 
institutions, these colleges and universities suffered from 
substandard facilities, unequal state funding, paltry 
endowments, and no blueprint for fostering racially integrated 
student bodies.115 Without the force of a clearly outlined 
adjudicatory remedy, states operated without any clarity as to 
                                                                                                                 
(discussing how proponents of black colleges contend that historically black 
colleges provide opportunities to preserve black traditions, culture, and other 
educational options). 
 112. See, e.g., Charise Frazier, Lawmakers Vote to Shutter SC State 
University to Manage Deficit, NBC NEWS (Feb. 13 2015, 5:18 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/lawmakers-vote-shutter-sc-state-
university-manage-deficit-n305396 (last visited Apr. 26, 2017) (discussing how 
the legislature voted to close South Carolina’s “only public historically black 
college”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). In addition,  
The Congressional Black Caucus, . . . outraged that some members of 
the South Carolina legislature have an interest in closing the 
[HBCU], calling this ‘overreaching and overreacting . . . .’ Chairman 
G. K. Butterfield, (D-NC) continued, ‘There are many remedies 
available to the state’s government without using the nuclear option 
of closing the institution.’ 
Id.  
 113. See Walter Recharde Allen & Joseph O. Jewell, A Backward Glance 
Forward: Past, Present and Future Perspectives on Historically Black Colleges 
and Universities, 25 THE REV. OF HIGHER EDUC. 241, 250–51 (2002) (discussing 
the lack of judicial guidance in implementing segregation practices in colleges 
and universities after Brown). 
 114. See John K. Pierre & Charity R. Welch, Why Historically Black Colleges 
and Universities are Needed in the 21st Century, 1 J. RACE, GENDER, & POVERTY 
101, 111 (2010) (“While legal barriers to equality have been eliminated, socio-
economic barriers to equality still exist. Disparities are present in educational 
opportunities, educational attainment, and access to health care for racial 
minorities.”). 
 115. See Kujovich, supra note 111, at 44–112 (addressing issues including 
inequality of funding, programs of instruction, the consequences of separation, 
and segregation of the curriculum).  
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how to dismantle segregated systems of higher education and 
foster equality in educational opportunity.116  
C. Judicial Retreat from Racial Remedies  
While the Supreme Court remained silent on remedial 
structures for higher education desegregation, it began to eschew 
adjudicatory remedies for discrimination generally and for the 
type of sweeping racial remedies outlined in Brown II and its 
early progeny.117 Changes in Supreme Court composition and in 
social and political climate meant a swift end to the most 
opportune time for creative use of the Supreme Court’s equitable 
powers in the area of educational equality.118 As early as 1973, 
reshaped by four new Justices, the Supreme Court substantially 
limited the judicial remedies available to low-income and 
minority students in disadvantaged schools in San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez.119 In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that the 
United States Constitution creates no fundamental right to 
education, nor is wealth a protected class; consequently, there is 
no constitutional violation for a state’s provision of inequitable 
educational resources.120 One year later, the Supreme Court 
rejected metropolitan desegregation, the only available route to 
successfully desegregate the racially segregated schools in the 
urban core of Detroit, Michigan.121 In the limited avenues that 
                                                                                                                 
 116. See id. at 113 (describing the inequalities between historically black 
and white universities in addition to the difficulties and delay states had in 
instituting any graduate instruction in black public colleges). 
 117. See id. at 32 (suggesting that the course of desegregation in public 
colleges has been delegated to the lower federal courts after Brown II). 
 118. See id. at 31 (“The current racial identifiability of black public colleges 
suggests that the disestablishment remedy has not been carried out and that 
the constitutional violation therefore persists in public higher education.”). 
 119. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 39 (1973) 
(finding that there is no Constitutional fundamental right to education). 
 120. See id. at 30–39 (exploring whether the right to education is implicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution and determining that education issues should 
fall under the purview of the benefits provided by the States rather than under 
Federal or Constitutional protection). 
 121. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974) (concluding that local 
control over school operations and local autonomy over school transportation 
issues are essential to maintaining community support for the public schools 
and educational process). 
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remain, the Supreme Court has used doctrines such as remedies 
and federalism to curb their accessibility.122 In a series of 
opinions in the 1990s, a conservative Court led by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist issued a trilogy of opinions that severely curtailed the 
circumstances, means, and duration of school desegregation 
remedies.123 Understanding the persistence of racial injustice but 
exhibiting exhaustion with continued remedial decrees, the 
Supreme Court provided states with multiple avenues for relief 
from injunctions, even when some vestiges of desegregation 
remained, and even in cases where it was clear resegregation 
would occur.124 
In the context of higher education, the Supreme Court 
appeared poised to tolerate only minimal state efforts toward the 
broad concept of racial diversity rather than the more structured, 
vigorous racial remedies set forth in earlier opinions addressing 
public elementary and secondary education.125 Thus, institutions 
                                                                                                                 
 122. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 99 (1995) (“[L]ocal autonomy of 
school districts is a vital national tradition, . . . and that a district court must 
strive to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system 
operating in compliance with the Constitution.”). 
 123. See id. at 138 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that “federal courts 
should [not use] racial equality as a pretext for solving social problems that do 
not violate the Constitution.”); see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491 
(1992) (“[T]he court may determine that it will not order further remedies in the 
area of student assignments where racial imbalance is not traceable, in a 
proximate way, to constitutional violations.”); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 
237, 238 (1991) (concluding that “the legal justification for displacement of local 
authority in [desegregation attempts] is a violation of the Constitution.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248–51 (calling for the District Court to 
review every facet of school operation to determine whether de jure segregation 
had ended); see also Pitts, 503 U.S. at 490–91 (“While retaining jurisdiction, . . . 
the court may determine that it will not order further remedies in areas where 
the school district is in compliance with the decree.”); Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 97–
98, 100–02 (arguing the importance of allowing local districts to retain 
autonomy over their schools and concluding that directing districts on exactly 
how to achieve of “desegregative attractiveness” is beyond the discretion of the 
District Court). 
 125. Compare Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318–20 
(1978) (stating that a state may constitutionally consider race as a factor in its 
university admissions to promote educational diversity, but only if considered 
alongside other factors and on a case-by-case basis), with Brown II, 349 U.S. 
294, 301 (1955) (demanding that all U.S. schools must desegregate with all 
deliberate speed), and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 
1, 29–32 (1971) (noting that busing is an appropriate remedy for righting racial 
imbalance in schools). 
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of higher education tried to proactively address continuing 
inequality through measures that became known as “affirmative 
action.”126 In 1978, the Supreme Court invalidated the admission 
plan of the University of California-Davis Medical School, which 
reserved 16 of 100 places in each entering class for racial 
minorities.127 In doing so, however, the divided Supreme Court 
did allow for the limited use of race as a positive factor in 
admissions.128 The Supreme Court cautiously embraced a new 
constitutional framework for sustaining race-conscious measures 
that state universities voluntarily adopted to foster integration in 
education.129 This framework, while permitting some race-
conscious policies, operates explicitly outside of the remedial 
context and arguably rests on a very different constitutional 
foundation.130 Instead of a constitutional interest developed with 
an understanding of the persistent vestiges of racial segregation 
that was baked into the founding of the nation, affirmative action 
jurisprudence allows for the use of race in a historical vacuum.131 
Without connecting such policies to their original purpose—
remedying pervasive racial discrimination and segregation in 
higher education—it is easier for opponents of such policies to 
challenge them and to redefine the terms of the debate.132 While 
                                                                                                                 
 126. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 343 app. (“In administering a program regarding 
which the recipient has previously discriminated against persons on the ground 
of race, color, or national origin, the recipient must take affirmative action to 
overcome the effects of prior discrimination.”). 
 127. See id. at 275 (explaining the process of the admission committee when 
reviewing minority applicants). 
 128. See id. at 320 (“[T]he State has a substantial interest that legitimately 
may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the 
competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin.”). 
 129. See id. at 312 (“The freedom of a university to make its own judgments 
as to education includes the selection of its student body.”). 
 130. See id. at 368 (“Congress was empowered under that provision to accord 
preferential treatment to victims of past discrimination . . . and we see no 
reason to conclude that the States cannot voluntarily accomplish . . . what 
Congress . . . validly may authorize or compel either the States or private 
persons to do.”). 
 131. See Lia B. Epperson, True Integration: Advancing Brown’s Goal of 
Educational Equity in the Wake of Grutter, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 177 (2005) 
(explaining the “flaws in the contemporary strategy and remedies used to 
address the violation of rights that the Court acknowledged in Brown.”). 
 132. See Nikole Hannah-Jones, What Abigail Fisher’s Affirmative Action 
Case Was Really About, PROPUBLICA (June 23, 2016), 
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ostensibly challenging “affirmative action,” today’s litigation 
challenges are part of a broader attack on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.133 While the measure was 
drafted during Reconstruction to ensure the rights of African 
Americans, the question has become whether this clause of the 
U.S. Constitution now prohibits any use of race to help overcome 
the country’s “legacy of racism.”134 
As a result of shifts in the Supreme Court composition and 
social and political climate, the Supreme Court disfavors court-
based remedies altogether, favoring only limited, forward-looking 
“diversity” rationales.135 Even the limited use of race in college 
admissions “who point to the educational benefits that flow from 
student body diversity,”136 such as increased cross racial 
understanding and democratic involvement, is now in jeopardy.137 
This “jurisprudence of fragmentation”138 operates on two tracks, a 
                                                                                                                 
https://www.propublica.org/article/a-colorblind-constitution-what-abigail-
fishers-affirmative-action-case-is-r (last visited Apr. 26, 2017) (“Nearly 60 years 
after that Supreme Court victory [in Brown], which changed the nation, 
conservatives freely admit they have stolen that page from the NAACP’s legal 
playbook as they attempt to roll back many of the civil rights group’s landmark 
triumphs”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
 133. See id. (“At issue is whether the Constitution’s equal protection clause, 
drafted by Congress during Reconstruction to ensure the rights of black 
Americans, also prohibits the use of race to help them overcome the nation’s 
legacy of racism.”). 
 134. See id. (deciding whether the Equal Protection Clause can be 
implemented to prevent race being used as a factor in government programs). 
 135. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325, 328 (2003) (concluding that 
institutions of higher education could establish affirmative action admissions 
programs to further the institution’s important interest in cultivating a diverse 
student body); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 258–59 (2003) (establishing that 
the University of Michigan’s undergrad affirmative action policy with 
predetermined point allocations was unconstitutional). 
 136. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (describing petitioner’s claim that 
increasing student body diversity is a compelling interest). 
 137. See id. (“As the District Court emphasized, the Law School’s admissions 
policy promotes ‘cross-racial understanding,’ helps to break down racial 
stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better understand persons of different 
races.’”). 
 138. See Rachel F. Moran, Rethinking Race, Equality, and Liberty: The 
Unfulfilled Promise of Parents Involved, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1321, 1322 (2008) 
(describing three different ways in which Gutter v. Bollinger played a part in 
undoing voluntary desegregation). 
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“remedial” track and a “diversity” track.139 Each track arguably 
emanates from the same constitutional right identified in Brown 
II and its antecedents, but offers completely disparate theories of 
jurisprudence.140 For decades now, the Supreme Court has 
disfavored a “remedial justification” for race conscious policies, 
which previously served as the foundation for equitable remedies 
in higher education desegregation.141 
D. A Court Articulated Remedy for Higher Education Segregation: 
Fordice 
In 1992, nearly forty years after Brown II, the Supreme 
Court ruled on equitable remedies for the desegregation of public 
higher education for the first time.142 The United States v. 
Fordice143 decision brought to a close a seventeen-year legal 
battle, including more than a decade of court-supervised 
negotiations, a five-week trial in the lower court, more than 
50,000 pages of evidence,144 and two rulings by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.145 While the Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 139. See id. at 1321–22 (explaining how the courts have taken a race 
conscious approach to undo past discrimination while the courts have also 
recognized the diversity rational to learn from individual’s various 
backgrounds). 
 140. See id. at 1321 (discussing how Brown “endors[ed] a normative ideal of 
colorblindness, while others insisted that Brown recognized that race-
consciousness was necessary to undo longstanding patters of segregation, 
subordination, and stratification.”). 
 141. See id. at 1366 (“Culture-race becomes an insupportable justification 
because the Court fears that quota systems will intensify racial divisions rather 
than create a space for the development of racial identities.”). 
 142. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 743 (1992) (establishing 
that universities in Mississippi had not properly integrated). 
 143.  Id. 
 144. See id. at 725 (“At trial’s end, based on the testimony of 71 witnesses 
and 56,700 pages of exhibits, the District Court entered extensive findings of 
fact.”). 
 145. See Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1560 (N.D. Miss. 1987) 
(establishing that state officials are meeting their duty to disestablish the 
segregated system in higher education); Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732, 756 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (finding that state officials failed to uphold their duty and, in turn, 
are guilty of maintaining a racially dual system in higher education); Ayers v. 
Allain, 914 F.2d 676, 692 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (concluding that state 
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Court outlined the broad remedial requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Fordice 
ruling left the specifics of a constitutionally sound equitable 
remedy to the lower courts.146 Of particular note, it set forth a 
significantly less robust mandate than that which guided 
elementary and secondary school segregation for the prior four 
decades.147 In addition, it did so in a dramatically different 
political, social, and judicial climate than the post-Brown 1960s 
that gave birth to strong civil rights legislation and jurisprudence 
that spoke forcefully of the affirmative duty to eradicate racially 
segregated public education.148 
In today’s “post-racial” America, we had an African American 
president and a populace who feels more exhaustion than outrage 
when confronted with persistent racial inequality and 
segregation.149 Courts disfavor race-based remedies for existing 
racial inequality in a host of areas, including education, 
employment, and housing.150 In the context of higher education, 
                                                                                                                 
officials failed to try and dismantle the segregated system in higher education 
by not implementing new policies). 
 146. See Fordice, 505 U.S. at 743 (“Whether such an increase in funding is 
necessary to achieve a full dismantlement under the standards we have 
outlined, however, is a different question, and one that must be addressed on 
remand.”). 
 147. See Chaka M. Patterson, Desegregation as a Two-Way Street: The 
Aftermath of United States v. Fordice, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 377, 391–92 (1994) 
(“The differences between the remedies available to elementary and secondary 
institutions as compared to institutions of higher education are indeed 
significant.”). 
 148. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 743 (1992) (concluding that 
the state must dismantle the prior dual system according to their affirmative 
duty under the Constitution and Title VI). 
 149.  See, e.g., JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION: THE 
RESTORATION OF APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 316 (2005) (quoting Professor 
Roger Wilkins and explaining that many Americans feel “moral exhaustion” 
regarding racial integration efforts). 
 150. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009) (discussing how a city 
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by refusing to promote non-
black firefighters after they passed a promotion test); see also Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237–38 (1995) (explaining that courts 
use the strict scrutiny standard when evaluating affirmative action cases 
involving federal agency contracting); cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
335–36 (2003) (finding that seeking a “critical mass” of minority students is 
acceptable, while setting a “quota” for minority students is not). But see Adam 
Weiss, Grutter, Community, and Democracy: The Case for Race-Conscious 
Remedies in Residential Segregation Suits, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1195, 1196 
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adjudicatory enforcement and social policy favor more “universal” 
courses of action with only limited consideration of race to further 
“student body diversity,” rather than for the purpose of 
remedying present effects of past discrimination.151 Courts are 
loathe to take notice of the need for remedies for long-standing 
segregative and discriminatory policies.152 Instead, courts have 
more often absolved states of any responsibility or requirement in 
favor of allowing measures fostering diversity.153 The result is 
that even in the limited instances in which race conscious state 
policies in education have withstood constitutional scrutiny, it is 
for the justification of furthering student body diversity, rather 
than remedying discrimination.154 In addition, it is in the context 
of voluntary efforts by state institutions, rather than adjudicatory 
enforcement.155  
                                                                                                                 
(2007) (arguing that it is consistent with the Equal protection clause that judges 
may tailor race-conscious solutions to foster racial integration). 
 151. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) 
(articulating that the standard of strict scrutiny applies to race-conscious 
policies regardless of whether the policy is designed to discriminate or to provide 
a benefit); see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 
(1978) (“The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a diverse 
student body. This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an 
institution of higher education.”).  
 152. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (holding that thirty percent quota allowed 
by the plan was not “narrowly tailored to any goal, except perhaps outright 
racial balancing.”); see also Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. 
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“[I]t is completely unrealistic to assume that individuals of each race 
will gravitate with mathematical exactitude to each employer or union absent 
unlawful discrimination.”). 
 153. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Majority Politics and Race Based 
Remedies, 50 HOW. L.J. 827, 829 (2007) (discussing how courts have allowed 
states to remedy some of their own discrimination issues). 
 154. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (stating that “[t]he freedom of a university 
to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student 
body.”). 
 155.  See id. at 336 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the Congressional intent 
to encourage voluntary compliance).  
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E. Impact on Administrative Remedies 
Without the power of court ordered remedies to mandate the 
desegregation of traditionally white institutions (TWI) or the 
HBCUs, public higher education in the United States remained 
deeply segregated.156 Lower courts adjudicated claims of racial 
segregation and inequality in higher education without guidance 
from the Supreme Court and reached conflicting, muddled 
results.157  
Even in ideal conditions, the difficulties inherent in 
structural reform litigation merit a corresponding consideration 
of legislative and executive avenues for change. Through 
subsequent federal political activity, administrative remedies can 
help fill adjudicatory voids, or further the aims of existing 
adjudicatory remedies, as was the case with elementary and 
secondary school desegregation.158 Lacking the destabilizing 
effect of a judicially articulated remedy in higher education, 
however, administrative remedies operated at a sluggish pace.159 
No administrative guidelines for the desegregation of public 
higher education existed for more than twenty years after the 
                                                                                                                 
 156.  See Walter Recharde Allen & Joseph O. Jewell, A Backward Glance 
Forward: Past, Present and Future Perspectives on Historically Black Colleges 
and Universities, 25 THE REV. OF HIGHER EDUC. 241, 250–51 (2002) (discussing 
the inequalities in higher education after Brown).  
 157.  See Lia B. Epperson, Resisting Retreat: The Struggle for Equality in 
Educational Opportunity in the Post-Brown Era, 66 UNIV. PITT. L. REV. 131, 
133–34 (explaining the difficulties associated with enforcing desegregation in 
education).   
 158. See Lia Epperson, Undercover Power: Examining the Role of the 
Executive Branch in Determining the Meaning and Scope of School Integration 
Jurisprudence, 10 BERKELEY J. OF AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 146, 147 (2008) 
(discussing the executive and judicial interaction concerning the scope of school 
integration); see also Lia Epperson, Legislating Inclusion, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 91, 92–93 (2012) (examining congressional enforcement of racial equality 
in education); see generally Lia Epperson, Equality Dissonance: Jurisprudential 
Limitations and Legislative Opportunities, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 213 (2011) 
(discussing the efficacy of administrative directives and regulatory enforcement 
over traditional adjudicatory remedies for fulfilling constitutional equality 
imperatives). 
 159. In 1973, a federal court set forth a roadmap for the desegregation of 
HBCUs, offering a hybrid of regulatory and judicial remedy. See Adams v. 
Richardson, 480 F. 2d 1159, 1161–62 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (requiring the federal 
government to enforce Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act more aggressively).  
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Supreme Court’s decision in Brown.160 By the time the federal 
judiciary stepped in to call for more aggressive administrative 
enforcement, the “perfect storm” of judicial activism and social 
and political momentum that fostered significant change in 
elementary and secondary schools had largely dissolved.161 
F. Example of Maryland 
Public colleges and universities in the state of Maryland 
provide an interesting example of the difficulty in attaining a 
sound model for desegregation and educational equality in the 
absence of adjudicative remedies or a strong push for 
administrative enforcement. Even after the 1954 Supreme Court 
ruling that racially segregated education violated the 
Constitution, Maryland failed to adequately remedy the century 
long de jure system of racially segregated higher education.162 
Prior to 1954, the state forced black students to attend schools 
that lacked sufficient funding, facilities or programmatic 
opportunities when compared with TWIs in the state.163 It was 
not until 2000 that Maryland entered into an agreement with the 
U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights to bring 
the state into compliance with constitutional and legislative 
requirements. In 2006, however, a group of prospective students, 
current students, and alumni of the state’s four historically black 
colleges and universities brought a lawsuit alleging that the state 
                                                                                                                 
 160. In the area of elementary and secondary school desegregation, OCR 
implemented regulations in 1967. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1–80.13 (2017) (stating 
that “[t]he purpose of this part is to effectuate the provisions of title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964” which attempts to end racial discrimination).  
 161. See Epperson, Equality Dissonance: Jurisprudential Limitations and 
Legislative Opportunities supra note 158, at 219 (explaining that the Supreme 
Court declined to address racial issues in elementary and secondary schools, 
among other forums). 
 162. See Lia Epperson, Undercover Power: Examining the Role of the 
Executive Branch in Determining the Meaning and Scope of School Integration 
Jurisprudence, supra note 158, at 157 (explaining that the University of 
Maryland’s campus “remained ninety-nine percent white in the late 1960s.”). 
 163. See John K. Pierre, History of De Jure Segregation in Public Higher 
Education in America and the State of Maryland Prior to 1954 and the 
Equalization Strategy, 8 FLA. A & M UNIV. L. REV. 81, 88–89 (2012) (discussing 
the differences in educational facilities between African-Americans and whites 
in Maryland).   
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had failed to successfully dismantle the vestiges of racial 
segregation in the areas of funding, capital improvements, and 
program duplication.164 After six years of litigation, the court 
heard arguments in October 2012 and has yet to issue a decision. 
The state of Maryland’s continued battle regarding the 
desegregation of public higher education illustrates how, in the 
absence of a mandate from the Supreme Court, the quest for an 
equitable remedy in higher education has been foiled by contested 
definitions of the very notion of desegregation. The Supreme 
Court squarely defined “desegregation” decades before in the 
realm of elementary and secondary education in cases like Green, 
holding that states had an “affirmative duty” to remove all 
vestiges of discrimination “root and branch,”165 eschewing plans 
that simply removed explicit racial prohibitions as insufficient. 
There is no similar directive for colleges and universities. HBCUs 
contend that the state of Maryland never met its obligation to 
make the schools “comparable and competitive” with traditional 
white institutions.166 Maryland’s traditionally white institutions, 
like their counterparts in other southern states, received 
preferential treatment from the state for decades.167 This resulted 
in persistent inequities in facilities, programmatic offerings, 
faculty, and scholarships for students.168 HBCUs in the state 
have consistently called for increased funding for new programs 
and facilities that would attract students of all races.169 
The state body governing higher education, however, argues 
that desegregation should be defined simply as providing 
                                                                                                                 
 164. See generally Coal. for Equity and Excellence in Md. Higher Educ. v. 
Md. Higher Educ. Comm’n, No. CCB-06-2773, 2011 WL 2217481 (D. Md. June 6, 
2011) (examining types of funding in the context of higher education.).  
 165. See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1968) (describing how 
“[s]chool boards such as the respondent then operating state-compelled dual 
systems were clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps 
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination 
would be eliminated.”). 
 166. See Jaschik, supra note 109 (discussing the arguments in support of 
funding new initiatives and facilities for historically black colleges) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  
 167. See id. (explaining that traditionally white institutions have also 
received preferential treatment regarding funding). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 379 
prospective students with the freedom to choose to attend any 
public college or university in the state and removing explicit 
racial barriers from admission.170 By this definition, the state of 
Maryland has more than fulfilled its duty, as the vast majority of 
African American students in the state attend traditionally white 
institutions today.171 However, this is a definition of a remedy 
that was squarely dismissed by the Supreme Court in earlier 
opinions regarding primary education.172 
These contested definitions of desegregation flow from 
contested views of the role of history. A study of Maryland and 
the quest for desegregated higher education also provides a 
worthwhile illustration of the role of history, and the ways in 
which state governments used HBCUs as tools to enforce 
segregation.173 From 1926 to 1936, HBCUs received roughly 25 
percent of the funding that traditionally white institutions 
received.174 Today, the state governing body has called such 
history immaterial to existing disparities in infrastructure.175 
Rather than vestiges of segregation, the state sees them as 
irrelevant since all students are now provided a choice of public 
colleges and universities. In other words, no student, regardless 
of race, need attend the financially crippled HBCUs. 
Finally, the case of Maryland provides an interesting view 
into the role of research. In examining avenues for altering 
historical patterns of racially segregated college and university 
attendance, research findings suggested creating high demand, 
                                                                                                                 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. (citing state’s argument that in 2012, fifty-nine percent of 
African American students enrolled in public four year colleges or universities 
in Maryland attended institutions other than HBCUs, and going on to assert 
that this figure rises to eighty-one percent if including community colleges and 
private institutions).  
 172. See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441–42 (1968) (rejecting the 
New Kent School Board’s “freedom of choice” plan as insufficient plan for 
remedying segregation). 
 173. Jaschik, supra note 109.  
 174. See id. (noting that one traditionally white institution in the state of 
Maryland received $742,000, while three HBCUs received a combined total of 
$774,000 over a span of 10 years between 1926 and 1936).  
 175. See id. (“The state argues that enrollment figures show that all 
Maryland colleges are open to students of all races, and says that the ‘vast 
majority’ of black students attend institutions other than historically black 
colleges.”). 
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unique programs at HBCUs. The theory, adopted from school 
desegregation litigation strategy leading to Brown, is that “green 
follows white.”176 By enticing white enrollment to HBCUs, money 
would follow. The issue at stake in the current Maryland 
litigation centers largely on the allegation that the state is 
perpetuating segregation by “unnecessarily duplicating” scores of 
academic programs offered at HBCUs at traditionally white 
institutions.177 In 2013, the case remains open.178 The district 
court has yet to issue a remedial opinion to determine whether or 
what remedy may be available to fix the broken system. 
IV. Conclusion 
An examination of some of the challenges of seeking racial 
equality in higher education provides a striking refutation of the 
oft-cited argument that constitutional injunctions have been 
ineffective in spurring social change. On the contrary, equitable 
decrees in education cases have served a critical function in 
destabilizing apartheid norms.179 Such adjudicatory remedies 
provided fertile ground to allow for the ensuing regulatory 
                                                                                                                 
 176. See, e.g., Marilyn V. Yarbrough, Still Separate and Still Unequal, 36 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 685, 692 (1995) (describing “green follows white” as a 
phrase commonly used in African American communities to describe the 
phenomenon of money and other resources being spent on other projects when 
an area’s white population leaves and is replaced by a black population). 
 177. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 40, Coal. For Equity and Excellence in 
Md. Higher Educ. v. Md. Higher Educ. Comm’n, (D. Md. Jun. 6, 2011) (No. 
06CV02773) (“In 1965, however, rather than encourage integration at Morgan 
State, Maryland established University of Maryland Baltimore County (UMBC). 
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its programs.”). 
 178. Coal. for Equity and Excellence in Md. Higher Educ. v. Md. Higher 
Educ. Comm’n, No. CCB-06-2773, 2011 WL 2217481 (D. Md. June 6, 2011).  
 179. See Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 616 F.2d 305, 318 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(“Indeed, it appears that school desegregation is one of the areas in which 
voluntary resolution is preferable to full litigation because the spirit of 
cooperation inherent in good faith settlement is essential to the true long-range 
success of any desegregation remedy”), overruled by Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 
873 (1998); see also Kathleen Snyder Schoene, Note, Voluntarily Unlocking the 
Schoolhouse Door: The Use of Class Action Consent Decrees in School 
Desegregation, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 1305, 1309 (1982) (“Voluntary resolution in 
school desegregation is preferable to full litigation because the cooperation 
inherent in a settlement ensures the long-range success of the desegregation 
plan.”). 
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enforcement and administrative directives to take hold. Equitable 
decrees, complemented by other equality initiatives from federal 
political branches, produced significant social reform in primary 
education. For the years when the factors worked together, 
American public schools became more racially inclusive, and 
students garnered academic, social, and “democratic” benefits 
that have been well documented in social science research.180  
As was the case in elementary and secondary education, 
courts could have used equitable power in more radical ways in 
higher education to undermine the existing structure of racial 
inequality.181 Some options included requiring traditionally white 
institutions to merge with black institutions to achieve racial 
balancing, but placing the closure burden on the white 
institutions. By creatively assessing varied equitable remedies, 
the Supreme Court could come closer to fulfilling the equal 
protection requirement set forth in Brown in a manner that may 
benefit students of all races. In the absence of a constitutionally 
defined remedy for higher education, however, states failed to act 
to effectuate the constitutionally articulated right outlined in 
Brown I. This glaring absence of any Supreme Court decision 
outlining equitable remedies for the constitutional violation of 
racially segregated and discriminatory colleges and universities 
allowed for the existing inequality to continue unfettered for 
decades.  
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